“Future wars will be conducted in the “headspace” rather than the “battlespace”. Discuss.”
Over the last few centuries, warfare has evolved in leaps and bounds. Wars of attrition, wars of strategy and wars of non-state actors have all been prevalent throughout the last 150 years, each taking a distinctly different approach in the way they are conducted. War continues to be an essential part of the way groups, usually states, conduct themselves in the pursuit of policy. Today, we can see that it is equally essential to ensure not just the destruction of the enemy, but the protection and support of non-combatants. Warfare has reached past the point where it can be conducted on a single battlefield; the ideas, perceptions and opinions of those who are not directly involved in combat now have significant impact on the outcomes of war.
This essay will argue that war in the 21st century will continue to be fought as much, if not more, in the ‘headspace’ rather than the ‘battlespace’ and that this is due to the evolution of Fourth Generation Warfare .First, this essay will present the evolution of warfare over the last century and introduce the concept of fourth generation warfare. This essay will then show that trends set in the 20th century have paved the way for fourth generation warfare as the predominant form by using examples from the Chinese Revolution, the Malayan Emergency, and the Vietnam War. This essay will also show how this has translated into current conflicts such as coalition efforts in Afghanistan.
In 1989, William S. Lind led an article which would detail his definitions of the four distinct generations of warfare (Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton, Wilson 1989). First generation warfare, according to Lind, developed at the invention of the smoothbore musket and the beginning of line and column tactics; they are well demonstrated in the Napoleonic wars. These tactics were used to maximise fire power and increase rates of fire. These wars climaxed at specific points and saw bloody and brutal battles with high casualty rates. Second generation warfare evolved out of barbed wire, machine guns and indirect fire. Characterised by the trench warfare of World War I, it is based on the attrition of the enemy force. This form of warfare was driven by technology and the use of linear advances of infantry after artillery bombardment. Third generation warfare became prominent after the German blitzkrieg in World War II and was based on manoeuvre rather than attrition. While technology played an important role, this warfare was based on ideas. It saw warfare surpass linear tactics and relied on the infiltration and collapse of the enemy in contrast to closing with and destroying them (Lind et al 1989).
Lind continues on to identify what he believes will characterise fourth generation warfare. He states that it is likely to be widely dispersed, non-linear and have largely undefined borders, the distinction between war and peace will become blurred and it may become impossible to separate civilians from military (Lind 1989). In a later article, Lind identifies that the shift to fourth generation warfare is predominantly due to the state losing its monopoly on war. This is shown by the emergence of many non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and the FARC (Lind 2004). In 1994, Thomas Hammes announced that the fourth generation of warfare as described by Lind et al has indeed evolved and is continuing to evolve and be used throughout the world. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1996) argue that this generation of warfare is characterised by what they call ‘netwar’ and that conflicts will be increasingly fought by networks of associated combatants rather than the hierarchy of conventional military forces. They state that many groups may be leaderless and they have an ability to come together to attack and disperse afterwards quickly (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001). Martin Van Crevald (1991) shows that 1945 and 1991 were 160 armed conflicts, with one third of those being classified as low intensity conflicts. These are characterised by being predominately in developing nations, rarely involving regular armies, often being a conventional military force against a small guerrilla or terrorist force, and that most are low-technology wars. These factors are closely related to those which have characterised fourth generation warfare.
Through the descriptions of the four generations of warfare, it can be seen that first, second and third generation warfare were fought predominately through conventional force approaches, that is, the enemy is defeated by either physically destroying them or physically rendering them combat ineffective. Fourth Generation warfare is distinctly different because it begins to attack ideas. It brings the fight into the headspace by shaping public opinion, support and morale. Physical destruction is no longer necessary if support for the cause is lost. Here, the shift can be seen clearly towards warfare in the ‘headspace’ rather than the ‘battlespace’.
This essay will now show that this form of ‘headspace’ warfare has been developed over more than 80 years and now continues to be fought on contemporary battlefields as the predominant form of war. From as early as the 1920’s, Mao Tse-Tung was engaged in a series of wars which would see his forces ultimately defeat forces which were far superior in both numbers and training. The efforts of Mao ultimately led to his victory in 1949 and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (Beckett 2001). During his time as an insurgent, Mao set out three phases to conduct a successful insurgency;
Phase one: Building political strength. Military action is limited to operations which foster support for the insurgency, such as propaganda and political assassinations.
Phase two: The insurgents gain control of base areas which they actively govern. Military operations are limited to the capture of arms and to harass enemy forces, no major military offensive is undertaken.
Phase three: Forces are committed to a regular, more conventional final offensive against the enemy. (Tse-Tung, 1938, Hammes, 2006)
The events of the Malayan Emergency, which would see the British territory of Malaya against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) commanded by Chin Peng, led to important development of warfare in the ‘headspace’, but this time it would be the counter-insurgency forces that would revolutionise warfare. Peng attempted to adopt Mao’s three phase tactic and used the traditional dictum of Lenin, believing that through terror they would corrode the government (Barber 1971, Nagl 2005). In support of the insurgents, Peng controlled a second army, the Min Yuen, or ‘Masses Movement’, which would form the auxiliary base of communist support (Barber 1971). These members were non-combatants and were essentially unidentifiable as communists; they were the suppliers, spies, saboteurs and couriers of the MCP.
To counter this, the administration undertook several sweeping and innovative policies which would aim to ensure the local population would remain firmly allied with the government. The most notable was a comprehensive resettlement plan, ‘the Briggs Plan’ which would see half a million Chinese immigrants living in large squatter communities resettled into new villages and provided with private land, business opportunities and constant security (Barber 1971, Nagl 2005). This policy achieved two things: Firstly, the squatters became land owners who were able to engage in a capitalist system thus shaping their ideological views, and secondly, it brought a large number of immigrants, usually illegal ones, into a productive, meaningful role in society, made them citizens and provided them with a strong reason to protect what they have and resist the communists (Barber1971). Additionally, by establishing these villages the government effectively realigned the communist’s main suppliers, the Min Yuen, and began denying the insurgents large quantities of food and supplies. In this example, it can be seen that by shaping the ideologies, motivations and priorities of large portions of the population, the government was able to deny the enemy their reasons for fighting as outlined in their propaganda.
The final example of the development of warfare in the ‘headspace’ that will be discussed is the Vietnam War. The efforts of Ho Chi Minh and his revolutionary forces solidify and confirm the appropriateness of warfare in the ‘headspace’. Ho followed closely the three phases of insurgency as set out by Mao (Hammes 2006). When the United States entered the theatre Ho endeavoured to develop intensely his political reputation on the political stage. Ho openly explained that he would wear down US resolve through national and international propaganda in combination with the physical wearing down of US combat elements.
Ho portrayed to left-leaning westerners, including those in the US, that the Viet Cong were ‘freedom fighters’ fighting against a corrupt regime, he played on the severe repercussions felt by Viet civilians through the destruction of their homes and lives. To those who leaned more to the political right Ho portrayed a different message, that the South Vietnam regime was allowing the American soldiers to fight and die for it whilst ensuring that key party members remained or became rich (Hammes 2006). Through these different messages, Ho was able to reach a comprehensive audience and US domestic support for the war was irreparably damaged (Thompson 1970). Ho understood that the key was controlling US political will, through this he was able to turn consistent defeat in the ‘battlespace’ to major victories in the ‘headspace’ which would eventually see US domestic support become eroded so far that Ho’s victory was assured (Hammes 2006).
It will now be seen that the development of warfare in the ‘headspace’ as demonstrated be the previous examples is now being used in current-day theatres such as in Afghanistan. Throughout 2007 and 2008 Sebastian Junger became an embedded reporter with a US infantry element in the Korengal Valley, Afghanistan. He describes the unit being contacted by insurgents on a daily bases and being involved in extremely dangerous operations, however he also describes large efforts of the US forces to attend and facilitate community meetings with village elders. Through these meetings Junger describes the development of trust between the two parties to the point where local Afghans happily approach US forward operating bases to discuss issues (Junger 2010, War 2010).
The events described by Junger are directly reflective of the US campaign for ‘hearts and minds’, or the use of soft power in order to undermine insurgents (Lennon 2003). Lennon states that we are waging a war of ideas by, for example, painting terrorism as an illegitimate tactic so that no government can support it and promoting the free flow of information between locals and coalition forces to help promote the idea of freedom. Enhancing education systems and basic infrastructure have been key to attempting to establish stability, this directly ties into warfare against insurgents in the ‘headspace’ by removing the need for locals to take up arms and fight. Empowering citizens and establishing a legitimate government and promoting governance capabilities are equally important has also been a key focus of coalition forces (Orr 2003). So it can be seen through theoretical and practical examples that the idea of warfare in the ‘headspace’ is being used in contemporary theatres such as Afghanistan.
To conclude, it can be seen that war in the 21st Century will continue to be fought as much, if not more, in the ‘headspace’ rather than the ‘battlespace’. This essay has explained the development of warfare and shown that the development of fourth generation warfare is critical to understanding warfare in the ‘headspace’. This essay has demonstrated that it has developed throughout the 20th Century and continues to be fought in contemporary theatres. The strategy was first developed by Mao Tse-Tung during the Chinese Revolution, and he outlined his three phase insurgency. In Malaya, ‘headspace’ strategy was used in an innovative way to combat communist insurgents by helping to shape the ideas and beliefs of citizens of Malaya. In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh effectively used international and political opinions to ensure the degradation of US support and it eventually led their defence. It was then shown that these strategies continue to be used in contemporary theatres such as in Afghanistan through community development and ‘nation building’ tactics. Through these empirical examples, it has been shown that warfare has, is and will continue to be fought predominantly in the ‘headspace’ rather than the ‘battlespace’.
References
Arquilla, J & Ronfeldt, D 2001, Networks and Netwars: The future of terror, crime and militancy, RAND, Santa Monica, California.
Arquilla, J & Ronfeldy, D 1996, The Advent of Netwars, RAND, Santa Monica, California.
Barber, N 1971, War of the running dogs: How Malaya defeated the Communist Guerrillas 1948 – 1960, Cassell, London, UK.
Beckett, I 2001, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerillas and their opponents since 1750, Routledge, New York.
Hammes, T 1994, ‘The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation’, Marine Corps Gazette, viewed 13/10/2011, http://www.dnipogo.org/fcs/hammes.htm
Hammes, T 2006, The Sling and the Stone, Zenith Press, USA.
Lind, W 2004, Understanding Fourth Generation War, viewed 13/10/2011, http://antiwar.com/lind/index.php
Junger, S 2010, War, Harper Collins, London, UK.
Lind, W, Nightengale, K, Schmitt, J, Sutton, J & Wilson, G 1989, ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation’, Marine Corps Gazette, viewed 13/10/2011, http://www.dnipogo.org/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm
Lennon, A 2003, ‘Introduction’, in Lennon, A’s (ed.) The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using soft power to undermine Terrorist networks, The Washington Quarterly, Washington, USA.
Nagl, J 2005, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA.
Orr, R 2003, ‘Governing when Chaos rules: Enhancing Governance and Participation’, in Lennon, A’s (ed.) The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using soft power to undermine Terrorist networks, The Washington Quarterly, Washington, USA.
Thompson, R 1970, Revolutionary War in World Strategy 1945-1960, Secker & Warburn, London, UK.
Tse-Tung, M 1938, ‘On Protracted War’, in Tse-Tung, M 1961, Selected works of Mao Tse-Tung: vol. 1, Peking Publishing House, Peking, China.
Van Crevald, M 1991, The Transformation of War, The Free Press, New York.
War 2010, DVD, Sundance Film Festival, United States. Directed by Sebastian Junger & Tim Heatherington.
Word Limit: 2,500 Grade Awarded: High Distinction (88%) Markers Comments: Your paper discussing the increasing importance of the headspace in conflict demonstrated an excellent level of research, analysis and understanding. You used information to substantiate your position very well, referencing all relevant information well – this is a key element of all academic assessment and will stand you in good stead should you decide to continue your studies. Your paper was written with a high degree of logic and clarity, with an excellent structure. Great stuff.
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